If you feel a sense of d茅j脿 vu with the state of the US鈥揑ran war, you鈥檙e not alone.
In recent days, Iran has again the Trump administration lift sanctions on the country, unfreeze Iranian assets and remove its military blockade, in return for Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz. This basically reiterates what the two sides agreed to in a in June.
US President Donald Trump responded by demanding Iran for thousands of US soldiers and Iran鈥檚 own civilians killed over the past 50 years.
He is also (again) the US has 鈥渢otal control鈥 over the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran maintains the strait will remain closed until the US has met its conditions.
With both sides stuck in a rinse-and-repeat cycle in their rhetoric, it seems all the more likely they will again resort to military strikes to try to force the other side to concede. This has been the pattern both have followed since the war began on February 28.
Can this pattern ever be broken, and what would it take?
Repeating patterns show lack of exit plan
When Trump feels backed into a corner, he reacts in a predictable way. At least , he has threatened mass destruction of Iranian transport, energy infrastructure and even 鈥渃ivilisation鈥. He has then changed tack, calling off military strikes and claiming Iran and the US are getting closer to a deal.
The Iranian regime, meanwhile, has switched between engaging in and negotiations via intermediaries to and .
The US has also gone back and forth on its approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Trump announced a on Iranian ports on April 13, then doubled down by announcing Operation Project Freedom on May 4 to escort vessels through the strait. That operation was paused only two days later.
The US formally lifted the blockade when the two sides , but it when the deal fell apart weeks later.
Both sides have since returned to violence, with the US targeting and the Iranian regime striking countries in the region and vessels in the strait. There have been involving harm to vessels in the strait from March 1 to August 10.
Trump does seem to want to from the war, and Iran the economic and military pressure indefinitely.
Given this, why do these patterns keep recurring without any progress toward a resolution?
The US will not accept strategic defeat
Trump faces two options to break this conflict loop, and neither is good.
One option is to accept strategic defeat, lift the US blockade on Iran鈥檚 ports and withdraw its military assets from the region, leaving Iran in de facto control of the strait.
He appeared willing to do this by signing the memorandum of understanding in June. However, after reaching a deal, the Trump administration immediately began to travel via shipping lanes close to Oman that are not controlled by Iran.
Iran took objection to this, insisting the memorandum in the strait. On July 7, the regime travelling the southern 鈥淥mani route鈥 through the waterway.
The US responded with air strikes, and the conflict cycle kicked off again. It was clear that, despite what was signed in June, the US did not want to accept a strategic defeat that involved giving Iran control over the strait.
The US has a second option, but this, too, is not desirable. This would involve serious military escalation involving US boots on the ground in Iran.
This could very well break the tit-for-tat conflict cycle and force Iran鈥檚 hand. But it would also involve high political risk and military costs for the US and the region, which in an election year could be disastrous for Trump and his Republican Party.
Iran is focused on regime survival, not peace
On the Iranian side, the regime is alternating between trying to reach agreement with the US to alleviate the economic stress on the country, and holding onto its main point of leverage: complete control over the Strait of Hormuz.
The regime sees this conflict as existential, which is why it is so fixated on controlling the strait and accepting a long war.
The new supreme leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, recently filled six top security and defence positions with hardliners fiercely loyal to the regime, seemingly .
This includes the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei, a hardline ideologue, as , Iran鈥檚 central security body.
A commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the long Iran鈥揑raq war, Rezaei said in April he welcomed a US ground invasion because 鈥渨e would take thousands of hostages and then for each hostage we would get a billion dollars鈥.
Trump expects the Iranian regime to buckle under repeated economic and military pressure, but this only seems to be hardening Iran鈥檚 resistance. For a regime under strain and unpopular with its own people, focusing on an external threat and a long war may be the surest way to guarantee regime unity and survival.
The conflict loop could break if either side is politically and militarily exhausted to the point that ending the war is desirable above all other options. However, that point might still be months, or even years, away.
, Associate Professor in International Relations,
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