New papers released by the National Archives of Australia reveal how the decision was made for Australia to join the US鈥檚 鈥渃oalition of the willing鈥.
Release of 鈥榤issing papers鈥 from 2003 shines a light on how Australian troops were sent to fight the Iraq聽War
On March 14, the National Archives of Australia (NAA) released documents from the Howard Government鈥檚 National Security Committee (NSC) of cabinet. They all relate to Australia鈥檚 entry into the Iraq War in 2003.
This tranche goes beyond the archive鈥檚 release of a selection of the records of full cabinet on January 1 2024.
So what do they tell us about the decision to send Australia to war?
What was the National Security Committee?
Australian cabinets have usually been assisted by standing and ad hoc committees. The NSC was the peak decision-making body for national security and major foreign policy matters during the Howard government (1996 to 2007).
Its meetings were attended by relevant ministers and senior officials. These officials included the heads of the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force and the head of the Office of National Assessments. Unlike other cabinet committees, decisions of the NSC did not require the endorsement of the cabinet itself.
In the release of cabinet records from 2003, discussion of Iraq was scant. This made clear that a full appreciation of the work of a federal cabinet requires including the documents and records of important cabinet committees.
For the Howard government, that was the NSC. Future releases of cabinet records from Kevin Rudd鈥檚 government might need to include the Strategic Priorities Budget Committee (SPBC) or 鈥淕ang of Four鈥.
The release of 2003 cabinet records in January 2024 was followed by a concerted media campaign for the full release of government records on Iraq. The prime minister intervened, ordering a review conducted by former senior public servant, Dennis Richardson. One of the review鈥檚 key recommendations concerned the National Archives. This was that its yearly proactive release of cabinet records those of the NSC.
What do the 2003 NSC documents tell us?
The NSC records reveal planning for Australian military involvement in Iraq was under way well before the formal cabinet decision to join President George W. Bush鈥檚 鈥渃oalition of the willing鈥 on March 18 2003. For some historians, this will confirm to join the war at least as early as 2002.
In a record of a meeting on January 10 2003, the minister for defence, Robert Hill, and the defence force chief noted that some deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) units would be necessary within a month to meet indicative planning from US Central Command 鈥渙n the likely time-frame for possible military action against Iraq鈥.
At the same meeting, the NSC agreed to approve specific forward deployments of ADF units from a list the committee had previously agreed on August 26 and December 4 2002. These ADF units were admittedly not to engage in any military action against Iraq unless the government expressly authorised it. But the reference to decisions to forward deploy the ADF in 2002 points to the necessity for these records to be made public.
In the meeting on January 10, Howard made clear any Australian decision formally to commit the ADF in Iraq would be referred to the full cabinet. He also noted he had 鈥渇oreshadowed to the governor-general the general direction of steps under consideration by the government in relation to Iraq鈥.
These steps, we know, did not include Howard鈥檚 originally planned reference of the Iraq matter to the governor-general via the executive council. The decision not to do so was probably because the governor-general, Peter Hollingworth, had on the war from the attorney-general.
Howard later advised Hollingworth that reference of the Iraq decision to the governor-general was unnecessary, and the ADF could be deployed under section 8 of the Defence Act.
Another of the NSC files includes the minute of March 18 2003, containing full cabinet鈥檚 authorisation of military action in Iraq. The full cabinet file had nothing else. The NSC file includes a submission from Hill, 鈥渃irculated in the cabinet room on 17 and 18 March鈥 seeking cabinet agreement on a national policy for possible military operations in Iraq.
Hill鈥檚 submission indicated that before the Australian government had received a formal request for support for Coalition operations, it had authorised the ADF to conduct 鈥減rudent contingency planning鈥 for a range of capabilities in Iraq. US targeting strategy, Hill reported, included supporting 鈥渞egime change鈥 along with incapacitating Iraq鈥檚 鈥渄elivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)鈥.
This document illustrates the tensions between Australian and US war aims in Iraq. The paramount US objective was regime change. Australian policy was not to foster regime change, 鈥渁lthough the Government has recognised this may be a desirable, even inevitable, outcome of military action鈥.
The file also includes the 鈥渕emorandum of advice鈥 constituting the legal justification for Australian participation in Iraq. The advice was authored not by the solicitor-general but by first assistant secretaries in DFAT and the Attorney-General鈥檚 Department.
When published, the memorandum was sharply criticised by legal scholars and former solicitor-general . The later release of departmental documents will permit us to see what other legal opinions on the war were held in the two departments.
Now we need to know more
The proactive digitisation of NSC documents on Iraq is a welcome development for which the National Archives should be congratulated. It should be commended, too, for foreshadowing the release of other NSC records from 2003.
However, fuller understanding of how and why Australia went to war in Iraq requires the release of NSC documents from 2002 and 2001.
, Associate Professor of History,
This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the .
