91É«ÇéƬ

Imagine that the Defence Minister directs the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to deploy Australian troops overseas – say, into Iran.

The CDF believes the operation is strategically unsound. The military objectives are unclear, the risks are substantial and the available forces may be inadequate. Senior commanders advise against the deployment, but the government decides to proceed.

Can the CDF refuse?

The answer is simpler than many Australians might expect. The CDF must follow the direction of the Defence Minister.

Section 8 of the Defence Act 1903 makes this unusually clear. The Minister has the ‘general control and administration’ of the Australian Defence Force.

More importantly, the Act provides that any directions given by the Minister to the CDF must be complied with. The language is not qualified. Parliament is very clear.

It does not distinguish between directions the CDF considers wise or unwise, strategically sound or strategically dangerous. Nor does it provide an exception where the CDF disagrees with the government’s assessment of Australia’s national interests.

Parliament has made the law straightforward: the Minister directs and the CDF complies.

Of course, it isn’t unique to Australia to have this system. It reflects one of the central principles of Australia’s constitutional system (and, of course deeper British history): the military is subordinate to elected government.

The CDF commands the Australian Defence Force (ADF), but does not decide independently when, where or why Australia will use military force.

Military leaders provide advice about threats, capabilities, operational risks and the likely consequences of different courses of action.

Ministers receive that advice and make the political decision. Once the decision has been made, responsibility for implementing it rests with the military chain of command.

The origins of this arrangement extend well beyond the Defence Act. Historically, the command and deployment of armed forces formed part of the executive authority of the Crown.

The Crown can command the military (and hence military service is sometimes known as the ), but Parliament would determine whether that military could legally exist, how it would be organised and whether the money required to maintain it would be provided. ÌýExecutive control of military operations is balanced by parliamentary control of the institution itself.

That bargain remains visible in Australia’s constitutional arrangements. The executive government determines how the ADF is used, but it can maintain and employ the force only within the legal and financial framework established by Parliament.

Parliament also creates through law the offices through which Defence is administered, appropriates the money required to sustain military operations, scrutinises Ministers and may legislate to regulate the structure and use of the ADF (as well as internal disciplinary offences).

In short, it is historically grounded and proper that the government commands the CDF, dependent on Parliament. Section 8 of the Defence Act 1903 thus sits within this broader constitutional settlement. It does more than confirm civilian control over the military. It identifies the channel through which that control is exercised - the Defence Minister may give directions to the CDF, and the CDF must comply with them.

Equally, the provision does not authorise the Minister to bypass the CDF and issue orders directly to subordinate commanders, individual units or ADF members (so for the fans of series Secret City, the plot line of Season 1, Episode 4 was not legally correct).

That limitation is important. Civilian (i.e. political) control does not mean that ministers become military commanders. The Minister determines government policy and exercises statutory control over Defence, while the CDF commands the ADF.

The Minister for Defence may direct that the ADF undertake an operation, pursue a particular strategic objective or operate within limits determined by government. The implementation of that direction occurs through the military chain of command.

Orders to subordinate commanders are issued by the CDF, or through officers exercising command under the CDF’s authority, rather than directly by the Minister.

That distinction also helps explain the constitutional position of the Governor-General.

Section 68 of the Constitution vests command-in-chief of Australia’s naval and military forces in the Governor-General.ÌýÌý

On its face, this language appears significant. In practice, however, the Governor-General does not operate as an alternative military commander or issue operational orders to the ADF. The command-in-chief power operates within the conventions of responsible government and does not displace the authority exercised by ministers or the statutory command vested in the CDF.

The CDF therefore has enormous influence, but no veto. Before a decision is made, the CDF may advise that an operation is unlikely to succeed, that the government’s objectives cannot be achieved with the forces available or that the risks to Australian personnel are unacceptable. That advice should be frank. Indeed, one of the CDF’s most important responsibilities is to ensure that ministers understand the military consequences of the choices before them.

The government is not, however, required to accept that advice.

Ministers must consider military expertise, but military expertise does not displace political authority. A government may place greater weight on diplomatic, economic, alliance or broader strategic considerations. It may accept risks that military commanders would prefer to avoid. It may pursue an objective that the CDF regards as unnecessarily difficult or strategically misguided.

Those decisions remain the government’s to make because the government, not the CDF, is accountable to Parliament and ultimately to the Australian public.

Parliamentary accountability is central to this arrangement. Although Parliament does not ordinarily direct military operations, ministers remain responsible to Parliament for the decisions they make.

Parliament may question the government, scrutinise expenditure, conduct inquiries, debate military deployments and, ultimately, withdraw confidence from the government. Its control is therefore different from command.

Parliament does not issue orders to the ADF, but it establishes the legal and political conditions within which executive military power is exercised.

So what happens, then, when the disagreement is fundamental? The CDF may conclude that a government decision is reckless (in this fictitious scenario, a ground force invasion of Iran that it will cause unnecessary loss of life or that it represents a serious misuse of the ADF).

The CDF may provide further advice, request that the decision be reconsidered and ensure that ministers fully understand its likely consequences. What the CDF cannot do is substitute their own decision for that of the government.

Ultimately, the realistic alternative is resignation.

Resignation is not a constitutional veto. It does not prevent the government from proceeding, nor does it transfer authority from ministers to military commanders.

A resignation is public, loud and would prompt public discussion. A new CDF is appointed. If that CDF also objects, they resign. Such a resignation would be extraordinary. It would probably attract intense public attention and could have significant political consequences.

A government faced with the resignation of its most senior military adviser might be forced to defend its decision before Parliament and the public.

The system allows for the public to be informed – although the decision to go to war does not rest with Parliament, but with the Prime Minister singularly ().

Once the government has made its decision, however, the CDF’s role changes from advising on whether an operation should occur to commanding the force required to carry it out.

Australia’s constitutional arrangements deliberately place the final decision in civilian hands while preserving a professional military chain of command. That arrangement does not guarantee that governments will make wise military decisions.

Civilian control is not a system for ensuring that defence policy is always strategically sound. It is a system for determining who has the authority to decide, how those decisions are implemented and who must answer for them.

Dr Samuel White

Dr Samuel White FRHistS is the Scientia Senior Lecturer in Military Law and War Studies at 91É«ÇéƬ Canberra. He joined 91É«ÇéƬ Canberra in 2026 after a period as a Visiting Fellow whilst working at the National University of Singapore (NUS). There, Dr White was the inaugural Senior Research Fellow in Peace and Security at NUS’ Centre for International Law. Dr White was retained as a Global Fellow at NUS where he continues to teach into the Singapore Academy of International Law.

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